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Devaluationand Related
Policy Measures
Thefeature that distinguishes Phase Ill from a straightforward alteration in
the exchange rate is the fact that the prior existence of quantitative restrictions
inevitably influences the way the change affects economic behavior. This hap-
pens both because devaluation alters the economic impact of existing quan-
titative restrictions and because devaluation is often accompanied by policy
changes that intentionally or otherwise affect the operation of the QR regime.
To be sure, a country using QRs to maintain its desired balance-of-
payments position could anticipate a future payments imbalance and adjust its
exchange rate just enough to offset that imbalance, leaving the economic im-
pact of its QR system unchanged. That was the case with Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia during the periods when each was frequently making small exchange
rate changes in order to maintain the real rate. Those exchange rate ad-
justments did not constitute Phase III episodes, since the QR regime did not
significantly affect the response to the exchange rate alteration. When a larger
exchange rate change occurs in a Phase II context, however, interaction of the
change with the QR regime is virtually inevitable.' Moreover, in many in-
stances the desire to alter the QR regime—at least to the extent of simplifying
it—has often been a motivating factor in the decision to devalue.
When QRs are an important restriction on the private market, price
changes cannot have the same effect as they would if desired and actual tran-
sactions had been coincident. For that reason alone, exchange rate changes
under QRs cannot be analyzed in exactly the same manner as would a devalua-
tion undertaken from an initial position of currency convertibility. In general,
however, a devaluation developing from a Phase II situation is usually accom-
panied by changes in other policy instruments. Some of those changes alter the
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QR system, and others affect other aspects of economic policy. For empirical
purposes the effects of each component of the policy package must be inter-
preted in light of the QR regime prevailing at the time of the devaluation.
Sorting out these Phase III policy components is the task of this and the
next three chapters. In this chapter the policy changes that comprised the shift
to Phase III in each of the ten countries are reviewed, and a framework within
which those components can be analyzed is introduced. The following three
chapters analyze those components in depth and examine the twenty-two
Phase III episodes in that context.
I. DEVALUATION PACKAGES
The sets of possible policies that can accompany devaluation are highly varied.
In general the packages that were adopted in the twenty-two Phase III episodes
covered in this project included five broad categories of measures. First, there
were the devaluations with their associated price changes. Second, domestic
macroeconomic policy was altered in attempts to reduce the level, or rate of in-
crease, of aggregate demand. Third, there were changes in supply brought
about—usually—by additional foreign borrowing, debt rescheduling, or
receipt of additional foreign aid. Fourth, the operation of the QR regime was
often modified. Finally, there were measures, undertaken simultaneously with
devaluation, that were not directly related to the objectives of devaluation.
Price Changes
Obviously a devaluation is in itself a major price change unless other, offset-
ting measures are simultaneously undertaken. In most instances the devalua-
tion represents the largest single alteration in price in the set of policies that
constitute the move to Phase III.
However, additional measures are often implemented. Some have a direct
bearing on the magnitude of the "true" devaluation, while others can have im-
portant effects that must be taken into account when analyzing the response to
the devaluation. Any changes in the charges on foreign exchange transactions
are in the first category. The second category includes such measures as in-
terest rate reforms, price increases for public sector outputs, and changes in
price control measures.
It will be recalled that one characteristic of Phase II is the tendency to pro-
liferate both price and quantity controls in an effort to contain demand for
foreign exchange, to provide incentives for foreign exchange earnings, and to
direct the flow of foreign exchange through legal channels. Many devaluation
packages have included a variety of measures designed to eliminate some of
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Special exchange rates for such categories of transactions as repatriation
of overseas earnings, minor exports, and tourism are often abolished at the
time of devaluation. In India, for example, a variety of export subsidies, in-
cluding exemption from indirect taxes, direct tax concessions, rail freight con-
cessions, and import entitlement schemes, were used during the period from
1962 to 1966. In addition, the National Defense Remittance scheme, initiated
in October 1965, gave resalable import licenses, valued at about 60 percent of
face value, to Indian nationals residing abroad in exchange for their remit-
tances.2 These measures were all rescinded at the time of India's devaluation in
June 1966. This had significant offsetting effects on the impact devaluation
would otherwise have had on the relevant categories of transactions.
In many countries during Phase II, special export incentives, at least for
minor exports, buffered the effects of domestic inflation (at a fixed exchange
rate) on export earnings. Those incentives often were abolished at the time of
devaluation. That was especially significant in South Korea and Israel. Similar
alterations occurred on the import side. In Turkey, for example, an across-the-
board surcharge of 40 percent on imports was rescinded within six months
after the 1958 devaluation. Many countries that imposed guarantee deposit re-
quirements against imports during Phase II either lowered or eliminated those
requirements with the devaluation. Since there is a cost-equivalent to such
deposit requirements, their elimination can be interpreted as a reduction in the
price of foreign exchange for the relevant categories of transactions.
In Chapter 5, the changes in the price of foreign exchange in each of the
twenty-two Phase III episodes are reviewed. Changes in special charges and in-
centives often made a significant difference in the impact the devaluation had
on domestic prices. Empirical estimates of the magnitude of devaluation must
take these changes into account in measuring the relevant economic variables.
The second sort of price change accompanies devaluation and may
modify its effects, but it is directed at other aspects of the economy. Analysis
of the impact of devaluation and related measures must recognize the role of
the other measures undertaken in the same time interval. In some instances
these changes must be taken into account simply because their magnitude is
sufficient to affect the working of the economy. Such was the case in the South
Korean interest rate and financial reforms that accompanied the 1964/65
Phase III episode.
Part of the price level behavior following devaluation seems attributable
to other price change measures rather than to devaluation. The removal of
price controls has been important on occasion, as in Israel in 1952 and Turkey
in 1958. In other instances price changes undertaken at the same time as
devaluation have affected the government budget significantly, with conse-
quences for domestic inflation.In Turkey, for example, public enter-
prises—which account for about 50 percent of industrial production—had
been selling their output well below cost, borrowing from the central bank to
cover their losses. At the time of devaluation in 1958, prices of outputs of the58 DEVALUATIONAND RELATED POLICY MEASURES
State Economic Enterprises were increased, with the result that the rate ofcen- Shod-Run
tral bank lending was slowed substantially. The role of public sector pricing in
the process of money creation was a significant aspect of the Turkish
economy's response to Phase III and of the behavior of the price level. A devaluation,
Whether that in
or whether it rei
Domestic Macroeconomic Policy question, which
exchange earnin
the policy pad
In many countries domestic monetary and fiscal policies were altered as part of mediately, aith
the Phase III package. Often the entire package was labeled a "stabilization source of foreig
program," an indication of the importance attached to macroeconomic There will usuai
measures. Sometimes the Phase III experience was motivated by an effort to yet responded s
control domestic demand, and adjusting the exchange rate was only one of a run—will be
series of policy changes designed to result in a reduced domestic rate of infla- period, premiut
tion. Such was the case in Chile in 1956, where the intent of the entire program domestic prices
was to reduce the rate of inflation, which had averaged 72 percent in 1954 and the export respc'
Thus there
In the majority of cases, however, the primary motive for Phase III before export
policies was to rectify an unsustainable current or prospective payments additional
tion. Imports were judged to be intolerably low or scheduled debt-service ing has been a
obligations could not be met without inflicting unacceptable losses on the large number of
domestic economy by reducing imports to a level that could be sustained by flow of imports
prospective foreign exchange earnings. Macroeconomic policy changes in government ace
these instances were geared to supporting the devaluation. That was clearly the years 1964 to
case in Colombia in 1956, in Ghana in 1966/67, in India in 1966, in South million from th
Korea in 1961 and 1964, in the Philippines in 1970, and in Turkey in 1958. In a When exter
few cases, such as Brazil's devaluation of 1964 and its aftermath, reducing ports, there car
domestic inflation and altering the external imbalance seem to have been twin tionary pressur
goalsofpolicy.Therewere,ofcourse,instanceswhere domestic goods is likely
macroeconomic policy was unaltered, or even unduly expansionary, following involved—cost-'
devaluation. That happened in Israel in 1962 and in Turkey in 1970. 1952-1955 Phas
Important questions arise as to the appropriate macroeconomic policy to liberalization of
accompany devaluation. According to extremely simple neoclassical models, it 1958 devaluatii
does not matter whether one raises the price of foreign exchange or deflates the equivalent to at
domestic economy. The presence of downward price rigidities, cost-push cant impact bot
mechanisms, and related phenomena obviously limits the applicability of that An increasg
analysis. Moreover, the presence of quantitative restrictions also changes the come of a deva
impact of devaluation from what it would have been if undertaken from an in- productivity of
itial open-deficit situation.4 Plainly the analysis of devaluation cannot be that increased
undertaken without consideration of the shifts in monetary and fiscal policy addressed in Ch
that accompany it. III episodes areDEVALUATION PACKAGES 59
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Short-Run Supply of Foreign Exchange
A devaluation, if successful, will result in increased foreign exchange earnings.
Whether that increase is simply a once-and-for-all shift in the level of earnings
or whether it represents a change in the growth rate of earnings is an important
question, which will be addressed in Chapter 9. Either way, increased foreign
exchange earnings represent a response to the a part of
the policy package. Such a response cannot, in general, be expected im-
mediately, although counterspeculative flows could provide an additional
source of foreign exchange during the period before the export response is felt.
There will usually be a period of time during which export earnings have not
yet responded sufficiently to finance the flow of imports that—in the longer
run—will be sustainable. If the flow of imports does not increase during this
period, premiums on import licenses will continue, and the shift in relative
domestic prices of exportables and import substitutes that would bring about
the export response will be greatly reduced, if not eliminated.6
Thus there is a strong argument for increasing imports during the interval
before export earnings have responded.7 This may only be done by obtaining
additional foreign aid or foreign credits, or by rescheduling debt. Such financ-
ing has been a significant component of devaluation packages in a surprisingly
large number of instances, although it was not always employed to increase the
flow of imports. Brazil, for example, obtained a net inflow of $486 million on
government account and $276 million from private sector inflows over the
years 1964 to 1966.' Egypt, in her devaluation, received credits equal to LE 20
million from the International Monetary Fund.'
When external financing permits an immediate increase in the flow of im-
ports, there can be significant effects both on domestic prices and on infla-
tionary pressures. When imports increase, the domestic price of imported
goods is likely to fall, and—depending on the nature of the commodities
involved—cost-pricerelationshipscan changeinconsequence.Israel's
1952-1955 Phase III, for example, was accompanied by a virtually complete
liberalization of imports of raw materials and intermediate goods.'° Turkey's
1958 devaluation was accompanied by an increased flow of imports,
equivalent to about 2 percent of GNP. That increase, naturally, had a signifi-
cant impact both on the price level and on inflationary pressures.
An increased import flow financed by foreign credits will affect the out-
come of a devaluation. It also raises other important questions: What is the
productivity of an increased flow of imports? Do the benefits resulting from
that increased flow warrant international borrowing? These questions will be
addressed in Chapter 7, where the macroeconomic and other effects of Phase
III episodes are reviewed.60 DEVALUATION AND RELATED POLICY MEASURES
Domestic Policy Changes The Exchange
There were more than a few instances where the set of policy changes affecting
the outcome of a Phase III episode included major changes in domestic
policies. In some cases, such as the interest rate reforms of Brazil and South
Korea, those changes were clearly and intentionally part of the overall policy
package. In' other instances, however, the government used the occasion of
devaluation to make changes in domestic policies that would have been
politically unpopular had public attention focused on them. In the Israeli ex-
Changes in the QR Regime
A motive that seems to have been important in a number of Phase III ex-
periences was the desire to alter the nature of the QR system. In some instances
the goal seems to have been to simplify existing regulations. In other cases the
wish to shift from reliance on the QRs to using prices to govern the foreign sec-
tor was apparently a dominant reason.
The Philippines' Phase III of 1960-1962 and the Israeli 1952-1955 period
are probably the two episodes largely motivated by the desire to shift to a pric-
ing system. In many other instances, however, there was clearly an intention to
alter QRs in order to reduce significantly the value attaching to import
licenses. That was the case in Turkey in both 1958 and 1970, in India in 1966,
and in Ghana in 1966/67.
There are a number of ways to reduce the restrictiveness of the import
licensing system. For example, some countries in Phase II employ import
licensing systems under which only commodities on an eligible import list may
be imported. Liberalization can come about by shifting to a system under
which the only items that cannot be imported are those specifically banned.
South Korea shifted from a positive list to a negative list following her Phase
III episode in 1964. Another means of liberalizing is by establishing a pro-
cedure under which import licenses are granted virtually automatically for
specified commodities. This change was effected in Turkey in 1958 and in In-
dia in 1966, and it represented a distinct change in the QR system in both coun-
tries. In still other cases the formal licensing system was left intact, but the
value of licenses issued was increased massively; that happened in Turkey in
1970, with the result that premiums on licenses virtually disappeared.
Experience with, these changes in the QR system is important for a variety
of reasons. First, such changes affect the total devaluation package and its
consequences. Second, it may be possible to rank instruments of QRs by their
desirability as mechanisms, by their influence on the export response to
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I the Israeli ex-
perience of 1952-1955, for example, a shift of emphasis from QRs to pricing
in the foreign trade sector was only a small part of the broader shift
from QR to price mechanisms within the domestic economy. In several cases
devaluation was the occasion for raising the prices of public sector outputs,
especially electricity, gas, and related services. This occurred in both Turkish
devaluations, in Colombia in 1962, and in Chile in 1956 and 1959.
In addition to policy changes extraneous to the devaluation itself, there
are exogenous events that can affect the outcome of a Phase III episode. An
important one, pointed out by Cooper," is weather, with its consequent im-
pact on the harvest. Given the importance of agricultural output for domestic
prices and for export supply it is hardly surprising that a fortuitous event, such
as weather changes, can affect the outcome of the devaluation package.
Another occasionally significant factor has been an exogenous change in the
prices received for a country's major export commodity. Fishlow, for exam-
ple, shows that the Brazilian Phase III episode of 1957 generated significant in-
creases in the quantity of exports of a number of primary commodities, but
that export earnings failed to increase significantly because of deteriorating
terms of trade.'2 An opposite circumstance surrounded the Chilean Phase III
of 1965 and its aftermath; rising world copper prices obscured the fact that the
Phase III changes had not been sufficient to generate any significant response
of exports.'3
Given the variety of measures that normally accompany Phase III
episodes, the basic problem for empirical work is to find a framework within
which meaningful quantification of both the impetus and response to devalua-
tion and the accompanying policy changes can be undertaken. The remainder
of this chapter sketches such a framework. The next three chapters employ
that framework to provide a systematic description of the twenty-two Phase
III episodes covered by the NBER project.
II. DEVALUATION IN AN EXCHANGE
CONTROL CONTEXT
The Exchange Rate under Convertibility
In an open economy without quantitative restrictions on international trade,
analysis of the role of the exchange rate lies largely within the domain of
macro- and monetary economics—a deficit (or surplus) on current account is,
by definition, an excess (or shortfall) of expenditures over income. If the
private sector adjusts its net wealth position by buying or selling foreign assets,
there will not be an overall balance-of-payments deficit or surplus.If,
however, current and capital account balances are not offsetting, it is in-62 DEVALUATION AND RELATED POLICY MEASURES
.1
dicative of an imbalance between desired and actual money holdings, given
government fiscal policies.
While all agree that, under conditions of full convertibility, a balance-of-
payments deficit or surplus is primarily a macro-economic phenomenon, there
is considerable debate over the precise way the exchange rate affects economic
activity. In all models, however, resource allocation effects will come about if
altering the exchange rate affects one or more relative prices.'4
In the extreme case of a small country where all goods and services are
tradable,the exchange rate may not play any role in resource allocation. It
could do so only if it affects one or more relative prices in the economic system
and that, in turn, would require specification of a neo-Keynesian model with
price rigidities or other properties that provide a link to real variables. More
generally, when some commodities are nontradable there is a presumption that
exchange rate changes (or domestic monetary behavior) will alter the price of
home goods relative to the price of tradables.'6
When domestic inflation takes place under a fixed exchange rate, produc-
tion of home goods becomes more attractive relative to production of
tradables, while consumption of traded goods is less expensive compared to
home goods. Given a particular set of monetary and fiscal policies (and instan-
taneous adjustment) it is apparent that as the price of foreign exchange in-
creases, production of tradables would increase, and consumption of tradables
would diminish. At some sufficiently low price of foreign exchange there
would be a current account deficit; at some sufficiently high price there would
be a current account surplus.'7
A basic question is whether one can find empirically relevant meanings of
the terms "overvalued," "equilibrium," and "undervalued." In theory these
notions can be fairly precisely defined for a particular set of monetary and
fiscal policies (and also a given level of capital inflows and structure of protec-
tion), although the rates in question might have to be described as paths over
time. For analytical purposes, the crux is the empirical definition of an
equilibrium exchange rate; given this, an undervalued rate is a price of foreign
exchange higher than the equilibrium rate, and an overvalued exchange rate is
below it. It is apparent that there would be a different equilibrium rate every
time the world price level, or the prices of major export commodities, chang-
ed. Alterations in domestic monetary and fiscal policies would also alter the
equilibrium rate. As Diaz noted for Colombia:
There is probably no exchange rate observed in Colombia during 1925-72 which
could not have been turned into an "equilibrium" one at some dollar coffee
price, even if the possible choices were limited to the range of prices actually
observed during the same period.'
Although attempts have been made to find ways to estimate equilibrium
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the present project attempted to estimate equilibrium rates for his country.
However, fluctuations in the "real" exchange rate—the price of foreign ex-
change deflated by the price index best approximating the price of home
goods—were extremely wide. As inflation proceeded at a fixed exchange rate,
most authors were willing to pronounce the exchange rate overvalued, despite
an inability to name an exact equilibrium rate. That practice is followed in this
book. An overvalued exchange rate will be understood to be one that requires
the support of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes or
one that requires foreign borrowing to bolster or prevent the depletion of
foreign exchange reserves. When overvaluation increases, either additional
QRs are imposed (or the restrictiveness of existing QRs increases), or there is
resort to net borrowing at a rate that is unsustainable over a longer period.
Such a definition is not conceptually satisfactory. As will be seen in subse-
quent chapters, however, it suffices for empirical analysis in most instances.
Although pinpointing the equilibrium exchange rate eludes this analysis, ma-
jor deviations from it are obvious. For example, all would certainly agree that
Chile's currency was overvalued in 1955—the annual rate of inflation averaged
about 48 percent for the 1952-1955 period, while a fixed nominal exchange rate
was maintained.
Focusing on inflation and its effect on the real exchange rate underscores
that aspect of macroeconomics that applies with equal force to analysis of all
exchange rate changes, whether under free trade with convertibility or under
QRs. Regardless of the system it is the real exchange rate that affects economic
activity, and—at a given exchange rate—domestic inflation in excess of the
world rate will lead to increasing overvaluation of the currency, all else
equal. 20
Impactof Exchange Control on Analysis of Devaluation
Although macroeconomic variables affect the real exchange rate under QRs in
the same way they do under free trade, there are significant differences in the
way devaluation affects the domestic economy. First, the devaluation package
often includes price changes that enhance or diminish the magnitude of the
devaluation. Analysis of this difference, which is really quantitative rather
than qualitative, requires only the setting forth of appropriate concepts per-
taining to the exchange rate. Second, devaluation is generally not aimed ex-
clusively—or often even primarily—at reducing an existing or prospective
payments deficit. This difference requires discussion primarily in order to em-
phasize that the usual "expenditure-absorption" approach to analysis of
devaluation is not fully applicable in an exchange control context. Third, the
fact that QRs are in force prior to devaluation implies that relative prices can
be affected by devaluation; this applies not only to prices of traded goods in
terms of home goods, but also the domestic price of importables generally can
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beexpected to decline relative to the price of exportables. This difference importance of th
highlights one of the central questions of this work: the link between quan- that elimination
titative restrictions, the choice of trade strategies, and economic development, of the devaluatio
the likelihood of
EXCHANGE RATE CONCEPTS
Phase III is designed to simplify the trade and payments regime. Sur- RELATIVE Pi
charges on purchases of foreign exchange and subsidies on foreign exchange In countries
earnings are often removed at the time of devaluation. It is useful, therefore, on relative price
to distinguish between the "nominal" exchange rate (NER), which is the pan- tradables relativ4
ty rate registered with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the "effec- force prior to d(
tive" exchange rate (EER), which is defined as the number of units of local (I) rationalizatio
currency paid or received per unit of foreign exchange. premiums attach
Corresponding to these two definitions are the devaluation distinctions: price of exporta
"gross devaluation" refers to the increase in the NER, and "net devaluation" unless conscious
refers to the increase in the EER. Of course, EERs differ among different tion in the variai
categories of transactions, and a single measure of "the" amount of devalua- plicitly accorded
lion under exchange control is usually an index number composed of the These four'
changes in different categories of rates. simplification of
The distinction between NER and EER changes is of great importance in are replaced by
analyzing the effects of Phase III episodes, and this is explored in detail in sècond—premiu:
Chapter 5.Inaddition, attention should focus on the behavior of the "real" through the repl
exchange rate as the concept relevant in theory. Price-level-deflated (PLD) reflect real dema
measures can be obtained for both NERs and EERs, and it is generally changes in supply (usuall
in the PLD-EERs, by category of transaction, that are theoretically ap- devaluation it w
propriate measures of the relative price impact of devaluation.2' tariffs and
are unchanged;
DEFICIT ELIMINATION scarcity premiun
When devaluation occurs in a country where QRs are unimportant for yet there would
regulating the balance of payments, the purpose of devaluation is to reduce the from absorption
deficit, or increase the surplus, in the country's current account.22 It follows but the amount
immediately that devaluation will succeed if, and only if, expenditures involved in seek
decrease relative to absorption. It is because of this fundamental proposition The third el
that analysis of devaluation is primarily a macroeconomic concern. importables and
But when devaluation takes place from an initial position of exchange ifl the price of f
control, the sole objective no longer is to reduce an existing or prospective licenses for
deficit. To the extent that devaluation is motivated by preventing QRs from liberalize compi
becoming increasingly restrictive, analysis can proceed along lines identical to by imposing sul
those for devaluation of a convertible currency. When QRs are in effect, practice. Alteri
however, the purposes of devaluation may also include the simplification of substitutes will
the exchange control regime, a shift from reliance upon quantitative restric- regime.
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importance of the trade sector in production and consumption. To the extent
that elimination of an existing or prospective deficit is not a primary purpose
of the devaluation, the usual criteria for "success" of devaluation, based on
the likelihood of improvement in the trade balance, are no longer relevant.
RELATWE PRICE CHANGES
In countries with convertible currencies the major impact of devaluation
Son relative prices is likely to come about through a change in the price of
tradables relative to nontradables. When exchange control and QRs are in
force prior to devaluation, it is probable that devaluation will also lead to:
(1) rationalization and simplification of the regime; (2) reduction of the
premiums attached to quantitative restrictions; (3) an increase in the domestic
price of exportables relative to that of importables and import substitutes,
unless conscious offsetting action is taken by the government; and (4) a reduc-
tion in the variance in the total rates of effective protection implicitly and ex-
plicitly accorded to various industries by the trade and payments regime.
These four effects are closely interrelated. The first—rationalization and
simplification of the regime—occurs when the piecemeal measures of Phase II
are replaced by an across-the-board change in the exchange rate. The
second—premium reduction—follows from the liberalization of the regime
through the replacement of QRs with pricing measures. As prices adjust to
reflect real demand, the premiums that had attached to commodities restricted
in supply (usually imports) are at least partially reduced. Even without formal
devaluation it would be possible to remove all QRs and to replace them with
tariffs and subsidies in such a way that domestic prices and international prices
are unchanged; that is, the price adjustment would exactly match the former
scarcity premium. This would represent complete liberalization of the regime,
yet there would be no resource allocation effects other than those resulting
from absorption of the premiums on QRs (as the domestic price was unaltered
but the amount paid by the importer increased) and the freezing of resources
involved in seeking licenses and administering the QR system.
The third effect—increasing the domestic price of exportables relative to
importables and import substitutes—usually comes about because the increase
in the price of foreign exchange absorbs part or all of the premium on import
licenses for many commodities. While one could, in the extreme case,
liberalize completely and leave the export-importable relative price unchanged
by imposing sufficiently high tariffs or export taxes, that seldom happens in
practice. Altering the domestic relative price of exportables and import
substitutes will be referred to as changing the bias of the trade and payments
regime.
The fourth effect—reduction in the variance of total effective rates of
protection— usually results from devaluation since the effect of shifting fromQRs to pricing measures is generally to reduce the amount of protection ac-
corded to the highly protected items, and to raise the domestic price of those
commodities previously accorded negative protection. One can imagine, for
example, a QR regime under which the average level of effective protection ac-
corded to domestic import substitutes was, say, 50percent.23If one then
shifted to a system under which an across-the-board nominal tariff of 50per-
cent were imposed (with effective rates in all industries therefore equal to 50
percentas well), this would constitute a "pure" variance reduction. In general,
devaluation increases the EER more for imports previously accorded "priority
rates" than it does for highly protected commodities. In the extreme case of
import prohibition, of course, it is not obvious that the relative price of the im-
port substitute should increase with devaluation.
The four effects—rationalization, liberalization, bias alteration, and
variance reduction—come about to different degrees depending on the nature
of the prior QR regime and of the devaluation package. Since a basic question
on which the NBER project focused was the impact of QRs, the question of
the role of liberalization—that is, the pure substitution of price for quan-
titative measures—relative to rationalization, bias alteration, and variance
reduction is central to the analysis of devaluation from a position of exchange
control and distinguishes it from that under currency convertibility.
Additional analysis and careful examination of the experience of the ten
countries is called for before any judgments can be made aboUt the relative
importance of these phenomena. Different regimes—QR or liberalized, with
overvalued or undervalued exchange rates—affect growth differently. The
basic problem is to identify the separate roles of each aspect of devaluation.
One hypothesis is that QRs are not inherently different from tariffs in
their effects but that the administration of QR regimes inevitably results in
greater variance in incentives than the comparably biased liberalized regime. It
is a well-known theorem of international economics that, under a wide range
of circumstances, the effects of a quantitative restriction can be estimated by
calculating the tariff that would be required to restrict imports to the same
level under the pricing mechanism; this permits the analysis of the effects of
the tariff equivalent of a quota. 24 Under that hypothesis devaluation with QRs
would have its major impact via variance reduction.
A second possible hypothesis is that QR regimes are inevitably more
heavily biased toward import-substitution industrialization than are liberalized
regimes, and that it is this difference in bias that is the major impact of
devaluation. Yet another hypothesis would focus upon currency overvaluation
under QR regimes and its impacts on foreign exchange earnings.
The interplay between liberalization, bias alteration, rationalization, and
variance reduction under alternative policy packages is a major theme
66 DEVALUATION AND RELATED POLICY MEASURES
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throughout the rest of this work. All elements have a role to play in the
response of the economy to devaluation, and the interaction between them
may also be important. Chapter 6 defines the concepts of bias and variance
more precisely and provides some evidence on the degree of liberalization and
bias reduction accompanying each of the twenty-two Phase III episodes. Part
III of this volume attempts to identify the separate role of each of the com-
ponents in resource allocation and growth.
NOTES
1. The Israeli devaluations after 1962 do not constitute Phase III episodes since quantitative
restrictions were not a factor affecting the impact of exchange rate changes. Similarly, the fre-
quent adjustments of multiple exchange rates in countries such as Turkey and Brazil in the 1950s
are not regarded as Phase Ill episodes. The intention was to absorb excess demand and thus to
avoid intensifying quantitative restrictions; there was no significant interaction with QRs.
2. Bhagwati and Srinivasan, p. 78.
3. Behrman, p. 27.
4. On this point, see Richard N. Cooper, "Devaluation and Aggregate Demand in Aid-
Receiving Countries," in J.N. Bhagwati. Ronald W. Jones, Robert A. Mundell. and Jaroslav
Vanek, Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971), and also
Chapter 7 of this volume. The statement obviously does not hold for the case where devaluation is
just sufficient to offset expected inflation and leave the restrictionist impact of QRs unaltered,
such as under a sliding-peg regime.
5. Strictly speaking it is possible for a devaluation to leave export earnings unaffected and
yet result in some benefits via absorption of the prior premiums on import licenses.
6. The argument is spelled out in Chapter 6.
7. See Chapter 8. An alternative is to reduce domestic demand for imports via domestic
recession.
8. Fishlow summary, p. 41.
9. Hansen and Nashashibi, p. 68. The official exchange rate after devaluation was U.S.52.3C)
=LE1.
10. See Michaely, pp. 49-51.
11. Richard N. Cooper, "Devaluation in Developing Countries." in Gustav Ranis, ed.,
Government and Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
12. Fishlow summary, p. 30. Export volume rose 30 percent, while export earnings did not
change.
13. Behrman, p. 3.
14. It is possible, of course, that resource allocation effects might occur even without such
price changes. For example, alteration of the exchange rate might affect the level of economic ac-
tivity. For present purposes, what is important is that debates over the appropriate model for
balance-of-payments analysis turn on whether any relative prices are affected and on the precise
nature of the macroeconomic aspects of devaluation. All would agree that, when relative prices do
change, significant effects can result and that QRs imply relative price changes in addition to those
that might occur in a QR-free economy.r
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15.Bytradable is meant a commodity whose transport costs are such that its price is closely Chapter 5
linked to the world price. When transport costs are extremely high, it is likely that the domestic
price of the commodity can change although the foreign price does not; such commodities are non-
tradables or "home goods." For present purposes the terms "tradables" and "traded goods" are
used interchangeably. Under QRs or prohibitive tariffs, it is possible that a tradable will not, in
fact, be traded, and the distinction becomes important.
16. Strictly speaking, when one refers to the domestic price level in such models, one is refer- easuFl
ringto a price index for home goods. For a fuller discussion, see R. Dornbusch, "Devaluation,
Money, and Nontraded Goods," AmericanEconomic Review 63(December 1973): 871-80; and Exchan
A.O.Krueger, "The Role of Home Goods and Money in Exchange Rate Adjustment," in W.
Sellekaerts, ed., InternationalTrade and Finance (NewYork: Macmillan, 1974).
17. Of course, one must specify what would happen to that imbalance. Presumably, in a
surplus position, individuals would be accumulating assets (or reducing them in a deficit position),
and domestic prices might well change over time as the altered asset position affects consumption
behavior.
18. Diaz-Alejandro, 15.
19. E. Bacha and L. Taylor, "Foreign Exchange Shadow Prices: A Critical Review of Cur-
rent Theories," QuarterlyJournal of Economics 85(May 1971): 197-224.
20. The country studies generally cover the period during which world prices were relatively
stable (see note 2, Chapter 2). Therefore: unless otherwise indicated, changes in the world price The background
level will be ignored in the following discussion. For those countries for which world price changes the devaluation
were a factor, the changes were more a matter of shifts in terms of trade than of price level by the country St variability.
21. As already noted, in a world of inflation it is really purchasing-power-parity PLD-EERs measurement of
that are appropriate; those rates are the PLD-EERs deflated by the applicable index of the world analysis of how t
pricelevel. tion, and reduce.
22. It might be, of course, that the major objective was a shift in the capital account balance. different sectors
This has not often been the case, however, and it simplifies the discussion to treat the capital ac- The first se
count as given exogenously. In reality, if speculative flows are reversed, improvement in the nominal and ef
capital account is likely after devaluation and the behavior of current and capital accounts may devaluations in well be positively correlated.
next section coy 23. Here and throughout it is assumed that the tariffs under discussion are not redundant.
Otherwise it would be possible that part or all of the tariff alteration was not reflected in domestic change rate char
prices, the measuremeni
24. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas," in their effects. La
Robert Baldwin et al., eds., Trade,Growth, and the Balance of Payments (Chicago:Rand policy measures
McNally, 1965). There can, of course, be differences between imposing a tariff and a quota; if, for changes in other
example, the foreign supplier of an import is a monopolist, his profit-maximizing price will differ ed under the two regimes even though the same quantity of imports is permitted.
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